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Alarms are a key functionality of any clinical patient monitoring system. When
developing a new system, alarm behaviour must be tuned towards maximising
patient safety from all points of view. False alarms are a major problem in patient
wards, and produce an effect called alarm stress, which may desensitise care staff
and may endanger patients. On the other hand, systems must be sensitive enough
to detect any clinically relevant alarm situation.
The purpose of this thesis is to study and optimise the alarm behaviour of a patient
monitoring system. Annotated monitoring data from hospital tests is used as a
reference when tuning system parameters. The platform can be used to rerun
hospital test cases in the development environment and produce results.
The goal is to have a system that minimises false alarms and does not give false
negatives. In this way patient safety is guaranteed from both ends; clinically
relevant situations are detected, but care staff is not desensitised by too many false
alarms.
Main results include optimised alarm configurations for the monitoring system,
and information about the subjectivity of alarm relevance classification in a clinical
monitoring context.
Keywords: clinical alarms, patient monitoring, false alarms, alarm stress, alarm
fatigue, nuisance alarms
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1 Introduction
Alarms are essential to any patient monitoring system. Their primary purpose is
to ensure patient safety during possibly fatal situations by alerting care staff of
imminent danger. Modern monitors are often configured to be extremely sensitive to
changes in patient vital signs, and false alarms are common. Studies suggest that
80-99% of alarms in hospital wards are clinically irrelevant. Alarm may be technically
true, yet clinically irrelevant. These alarms are called nuisance alarms. [26]
Frequent false alarms can desensitise care staff and cause an effect called alarm
fatigue, which may affect the quality of treatment and even patient safety. Nurse
response times are delayed, and overall faith in the alarm system is decreased. A noisy
hospital environment can also affect patients negatively. Solutions for decreasing the
number of false alarms are urgently needed. Concurrently, monitor sensitivity to
actual dangerous situations must not be hindered. [20]
During development of new patient monitoring technologies and devices, a con-
tinuous dialogue between project stakeholders is being conducted. Engineers and
clinical specialists discuss the configuration of the patient monitor with regards to
alarm behaviour and other life-critical systems. This process is difficult, as there is
no single truth about how monitors should be configured. Eventually, hospitals make
the decision on configurations to be used. Apart from the clinical aspect, usability
and marketing realities must be considered. In addition, current global regulation on
medical technology is strict and may slow down or prevent the development of much
needed improvements in monitoring alarm systems.
Continuous monitoring is traditionally used in high-acuity care environments
such as Intensive care units and Operating rooms. Low-acuity continuous monitoring
is less common, and usually intermittent spot checks are the prevalent monitoring
technique. Different monitoring requirements associated with these environments
are considered; it may not be feasible to apply similar alarming rules to low-acuity
monitoring.
The purpose of this thesis is to use annotated patient data for optimising alarm
system configurations of a patient monitor. The monitoring is continuous and done
in low-acuity wards. Data is collected in an undergoing clinical trial and analysed.
The goal is to study and improve the alarm behaviour of the system being tested,
and improve patient safety.
The main results of this study are optimised alarm settings for low-acuity patient
monitoring which minimise clinically irrelevant alarms. Valuable information about
the nature of clinical alarm relevance and how to determine it was also found. The
research methods applied proved viable for studying patient monitoring alarms, and
can be reapplied in the future.
22 Background
Both scientific interest in the clinical monitoring field and the medical engineering
industry contribute to this work. Being part of ongoing product development which
may affect the lives of clinical patients makes the work feel especially meaningful
and urgent.
The chapter will cover backgrounds of clinical patient monitoring and alarms as
well as vital signs measurements briefly. A relevant physiological background is given
with regards to principal issues related with the development. Proposed methods for
the improvement of clinical alarms are listed as well.
2.1 Physiological background
There are several physiological realities which must be taken into consideration when
developing patient monitoring systems and their alarms. Alarming conditions have
to be determined so that patient safety is maximised. The measurements used in this
thesis are mostly associated with tissue oxygenation, respiration and pulse rate. This
section covers the basics of these topics, and identifies patient safety issues related
to them. These factors affect the configuration and optimisation of alarm settings,
and provide a medical point of view.
2.1.1 Tissue oxygenation
The human body needs oxygen for various metabolic reactions. Cellular respiration
is the reaction where oxygen is used together with glucose to create the basic energy
molecules used by cells. This process expels carbon dioxide, which is later exhaled
from the body via respiratory pathways. Without oxygen, human cells cannot survive.
Tissue oxygenation is a circular process which starts and ends in the lungs. Its
purpose is to supply oxygen (O2) to cells and expel carbon dioxide (CO2) from cells
and the body. The process combines both respiratory and cardiovascular systems
into a loop. The respiratory system handles gas exchange between air and blood,
and the cardiovascular system transports oxygen and carbon dioxide between alveoli
and other tissue cells. The complete process is shown in Figure 2.1.1.
The process begins with pulmonary ventilation (breathing), which brings oxygen-
rich air into the respiratory system. Respiratory muscle activation creates a pressure
difference between the lungs and ambient air, which moves air in and out of it. The
respiratory system is a complex network of tracts and cavities. It starts with larger
tubes and gradually divides into smaller airways, eventually connecting to small
3Figure 1: Tissue oxygenation process [35]
structures called alveoli, where the gas exchange between air and blood takes place.
This part of the process is called external respiration.
In the alveoli, oxygen diffuses through thin alveolar capillary walls and binds to
haemoglobin molecules in the blood. The haemoglobin molecule has a specialised
iron (Fe) structure to which oxygen binds. A small fraction of oxygen simply dissolves
into blood plasma. The main transporter of oxygen is the haemoglobin molecule.
Oxygenated blood then exits the pulmonary circulation system into the heart and
gets pumped into the systemic circulation system. There it is distributed throughout
the body. Gas exchange between the systemic circulation system and tissues is called
internal respiration, and happens only through thin capillary walls. Interstitial fluid
mediates gas exchange between capillaries and tissue cells.
Blood loses oxygen and gains carbon dioxide during internal respiration. Carbon
dioxide is also carried by haemoglobin, but does not bind to the same place as oxygen.
Carbon dioxide is bound to protein structures in the haemoglobin molecule. De-
oxygenated blood continues its flow from small capillaries into larger veins. Eventually
blood flows back to the heart and is pumped back into the pulmonary circulation
system and alveolar capillaries, where carbon dioxide diffuses back into air and gets
expelled by pulmonary ventilation. After this the process starts all over again.
42.1.2 Hypoxaemia and hypoxia
Hypoxaemia is a state of abnormally low levels of oxygen in arterial blood. Hy-
poxaemia is typically caused by some kind of respiratory disorder, and may lead to
hypoxia, which is a more general state of oxygen deficiency in the body. Common
causes of hypoxaemia are various respiratory related disorders, ventilation/perfusion
imbalance (air to blood ratio in alveoli), drug induced low respiration rate, shunting,
heart problems, anemia, and apnoea. Symptoms of hypoxaemia are fatigue, shortness
of breath, confusion, headache, and skin colour changes. Hypoxaemia may lead to
hypoxia, but this is not always the case. Hypoxia is more severe than hypoxaemia.
Both hypoxaemia and hypoxia are treated by giving the patient supplemental oxygen
as soon as possible. [22]
Blood oxygenation monitoring aims at detecting hypoxaemia. Studies distinguish
several levels of hypoxaemia and thresholds for said levels. Hypoxaemia can be split
into three tiers of severity: mild, moderate and severe. Studies suggest thresholds
for these are 85–90%, 80–85%, and 70–80%, respectively. There are no universally
accepted limits for hypoxaemia. Most studies, however, seem to suggest that and
SpO2 value of 90% is a good indicator of hypoxaemia. Monitoring guidebooks
typically define two suggested thresholds, one for normal patient and one for patients
with respiratory disorders. The latter group have lower thresholds suggested. This
kind of adjustment can be made for any patient group that for some reason has
generally lower blood oxygenation levels. For example, people who live in high
terrain are accustomed to lower amounts of oxygen in the air they breathe, and have
therefore lower SpO2 values as well. Supplemental oxygen is typically administered
when saturation drops under the threshold consistently. [23] [16]
Hypoxia is a state of oxygen deficiency in cells. It happens when the amount
of oxygen supplied to cells is less than the amount consumed by them. The main
symptoms of hypoxia are fatigue, headache, nausea, hyperventilation, cyanosis (skin
and membranes turn blue), seizures, coma, and death. Hypoxia can be difficult to
diagnose, especially if its onset is slow. Extreme hypoxia is called anoxia, which
means total oxygen deprivation of tissues. Anoxia can quickly cause irreversable
damage to tissues. Those with fast metabolic rates are more quickly affected, for
example brain tissue.[22]
2.1.3 Pulse rate and respiratory rate
Normal ranges for pulse rate and respiratory rate are defined as about 60–100 and
12–20, respectively. Alarming thresholds are wider, and are commonly set at about
50–150 and 8–35. There isn’t as much debate on how to set these limits, as they are
already well outside the normal range. For sick patients in hospitals however, both
pulse rate and respiratory rate can be abnormal due to health status, medication, or
even the hospital environment and care setting. Being in a hospital is stressful.[18]
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Studies suggest that respiratory rate can be an indicator of serious health problems.
Individuals with respiratory rates higher than 24 breaths per minute are probably
critically sick and in life-threatening danger. Even going higher than 20 breaths
per minute is a sign of being unwell. Alarm limits for respiratory rate are highly
varied, but typically rates above 35 are alarmed. On the low end, alarming rates are
normally under 10, with limits set to about 8 breaths per minute. [12]
Apnoea means a state without breathing, which is generally alarmed after about
20 seconds of no breaths detected. Apnoea typically happens during sleep or heavy
sedation. Apnoea can be categorised into two distinct subcategories: central apnoea
and obstructive apnoea.
Central apnoea is caused by the central nervous system not sending proper signals
to trigger breathing. This may be caused by sedative medication or other drugs,
but also various diseases. Central apnoea is a principal concern in post-operative
monitoring, as patients are often sedated, and may experience central apnoea. Cen-
tral apnoea is easier to detect with unobstructive respiratory measurements, as no
breathing reflex happens.
Obstructive sleep apnoea happens when throat muscles relax too much and
obstruct breathing airways. Symptoms range from simple snoring to longer periods of
apnoea. Detecting obstructive apnoea may be tricky, as the breathing reflex happens
normally, but airflow is obstructed, this requires a direct measurement of airflow.
Apnoea may lead to serious complications and even death.
Typical patterns death in hospitals feature three kinds of respiratory behaviour:
1. Slowly accelerating RR value ending in rapid decrease and death (e.g. sepsis,
congestive hearth failure, pulmonary embolism).
2. Slowly decreasing RR value ending in death (CO2 narcosis) .
3. Intermittent apnea periods with normal RR in between, ending in terminal
apnoea (Sleep apnea with failed arousal).
These situations emphasise the importance of respiratory monitoring in preventing
unexpected hospital deaths. SpO2 alone may not be able to detect these deadly
patterns, as the measurement value does not decrease early enough. [27]
Tachycardia (high heart rate) means a heart rate of over 100 beats per minute.
It can be caused by drugs or various hypermetabolic states. For example exercise,
fever or sepsis. Tachycardia is usually a sign of systemic physiological perturbations,
and underlying causes should always be identified.
6Bradycardia (low heart rate) is when heart rate is under 60 beats per minute.
Young adults and trained athletes can have bradycardia. Bradycardia may be
caused by drugs and some physiologic states. Hypoxia and hypothermia can lead to
bradycardia. Heart diseases may cause bradycardia as well.
2.2 Clinical monitoring
Clinical monitoring of patients can be done during hospital care or at home. This
thesis focuses on hospital patient monitoring, but the underlying principles are
transferable and can be applied to continuous home monitoring as well. The main
difference factor is the status of the patient, which affects the requirements of the
monitoring system. Patient monitors are used throughout hospitals from Intensive
Care Units (ICU) to regular wards. Criticality requirements may differ, but the
technical equipment is similar. Used vital sign measurements may also vary depending
on the clinical needs.
The purpose of clinical monitoring is to communicate information on patients
to care staff. Multiple vital measurements can be followed, and medical personnel
can determine patient health status or make decisions on treatment based on said
measurements. The four main vital measurements monitored are heart rate (HR),
arterial blood oxygenation (SpO2), respiratory rate (RR) and blood pressure (BP).
Critical situations like surgery and intensive care units typically have continuous
patient monitoring. Lower-acuity environments, however, often lack continuous
monitoring and rely perhaps only on intermittent spot checks of the patient. Studies
show that applying continuous monitoring may lower the number of adverse events
in all wards.[3] [2]
Monitoring is done in real time, but collected data can also be analysed afterwards
for various purposes. In this thesis, data collected from hospital tests is used to
research patient alarm situations and further improve alarm configurations of the
monitoring system. Numerous data-driven methodologies can be applied to further
utilise monitoring data, ranging from simple patient population studies to predicting
patient status by combining multiple monitoring parameters.
Doctors can also use collected data to analyse patient health better. An example
of this is ECG monitoring, where the monitor makes heart condition classification
decisions in real time. As mistakes are possible, doctors can re-examine the data
manually afterwards.
Monitoring vital parameters can be used as a control tool for medical therapy
equipment such as anaesthesia machines. In this case, the machine has monitoring
sensors, which help control various functions of the machine itself. This combined
system is critical to the well-being of anaesthesia patients during surgery or alike,
7and offers invaluable help to anaesthesiologists.
Many other therapeutic devices have physiologic monitoring functionality as well,
and create a closed loop system making therapy decisions. Separate monitor machines
could also be used as controllers for other devices. Coupling monitoring functionality
with therapeutically active devices establishes very high accuracy requirements for
the monitoring system.
Monitoring provides various data outputs. Technical information about the
monitoring system and process is displayed as needed. Clinical information about
the patient is also shown, and can be interpreted by clinical staff during treatment.
These information outputs are by nature passive, and require the user to actively
watch the information stream. This is time-consuming, and often not continuously
feasible in busy hospital environments. This is why monitors also have an active
medium for transmitting patient information: alarms. Alarm are the most prominent
and perhaps best known feature of clinical monitoring systems. They are the last
link in the chain, letting care staff know something has changed for the worse.
2.2.1 Alarms
The word ’alarm’ is originally from the Latin word ’ad arma’, which means ’to arms’
or ’to your weapons’. It is, therefore, a call to immediate action. Alarms have been
around throughout history, and can be observed even in animals. At the most basic
level, alarms are simply signals delivering information in one form or another.
The reality of alarms in the context of clinical monitoring is not as black and
white as the previous etymological and biological definition suggests, but often quite
fuzzy. The underlying principle, however, is the same.
Alarms are an essential part of any patient monitoring system. Their purpose is to
inform care staff of some abnormality related to the monitored patient or monitoring
system. They monitor vital organ functions and clinical device operation. The goal
is to increase patient safety by early detection of possibly dangerous abnormalities.
Finally, according to the definitions above, alarms always prompt some action as well.
This can be immediate or delayed, but some kind of care staff action is expected
following an alarm. Depending on the severity levels of the alarm, this action can
be as subtle as slightly raised awareness of the patient’s status, or as visible as
resuscitation.
Monitoring systems communicate alarms to care staff primarily in two ways:
• Auditory: the alarm is indicated by a warning sound. Different sounds may be
used for different alarms, or even spoken messages. Alarms type and severity
8can be determined by sound.
• Visual: the monitor screen displays a text and/or flashes the alarmed parameter
name or some other area. Monitors with many parameters may show multiple
alarm conditions at the same time.
The required user action following an alarm depends on it’s severity level. The
hierarchy by which alarm signals are ordered is based on standards, which are defined
by clinical risk analyses. For simplicity, they can be reduced low, medium and high
levels. Additionally, some information messages may be transmitted by a visible or
audible signal. These messages are not alarms, even though their information might
still be important to the treatment of patients.
The idea behind alarm severity hierarchy is to determine the kind of action it
prompts. Current alarm standards define the way an alarm affects care staff work.
1. Low: This severity level is meant to raise the awareness of care staff. Nurse
workflow may be interrupted in the future, but no immediate action is required.
2. Medium: Requires prompt response from care staff. Current workflow likely
has to be planned differently in order to tend to the event.
3. High: Disrupts current task and required immediate response from care staff.
Alarm severity differentiation is a useful tool for placing more emphasis on certain
situations. The severity system of alarm may also be dynamic. This enables alarm
states to escalate their severity level depending on the situation. Contributing factors
may be further changes in parameter values, other parameters (multivariate systems)
or time of threshold violation.
Alarm goals can be categorised hierarchically into five different classes. In this
context, a goal means the situation or condition that the alarm is supposed to reveal.
This categorisation contains information messages as well, and can be viewed as a
holistic characterisation of the type of information that monitoring devices actively
transmit to users.
• Life-threatening physiological situation: detecting critical changes in vital signs
parameters which may lead to patient harm or death. Examples of this are
asystole, apnoea and severe hypoxia.
• Life-threatening device malfunction: detecting critical problems with medical
devices. For example disconnection from the patient or loss of power.
• Imminent physiological danger: detecting gradual changes in vital signs param-
eters which signal patient status deterioration over time.
9• Imminent device malfunction: detecting problems with medical devices which
may lead to malfunctions eventually.
• Diagnostic alarms: various information messages about non-critical clinical
or technical conditions which may occur during care and affect treatment.
Examples may be pathophysiological states of the patient, or information
messages from medical devices.
Based on the list above, alarms can be categorised to clinical and technical alarms.
The former is a diagnostic of the patients physiological status, and the latter focusing
on the functionality of medical equipment.
The relationship between alarm goals and alarm severity levels is fuzzy at best.
While the above list is intuitive in nature, it is not applicable to all types of alarms
and situations. Some patient parameters behave differently than others, which affects
the way alarm conditions can be defined and evaluated. Nevertheless, alarm severity
is the main tool for distinguishing the criticality of an event.
This thesis focuses more on clinical alarms[26], as they are more complicated to
evaluate. Humans are complex, and clinical alarm conditions are harder to define
and categorise. Technical alarms are considered as well, but the main experimental
work is focused on clinical alarms.
As invaluable as alarms are in preventing patient harm, they are not without
problems. False alarms are commonplace throughout all monitoring systems, and
cause significant problems in hospital environments.
Currently, the prevalent logic behind most monitoring systems is to make alarm
behaviour as sensitive to potentially dangerous situations as possible. This compro-
mises the specificity of alarm condition evaluation and leads to a high false alarm
rate. The approach can be defined as ’better safe than sorry’. False alarms and their
effects are covered in the next section.
2.2.2 False alarms
Frequent false alarms have been described as a "top ten" health technology safety
concern by the ECRI Institute [25]. Why are false alarms such a hazard? First the
underlying reasons behind the situation must be understood better.
As medical devices used during treatment grow in numbers, the amount of alarm
generating systems increases as well. More vital parameters are monitored and
different therapeutic machines used. Medical technologies are often technically
uncoordinated, which may lead to alarm redundancies. This leads to a hospital
environment with lots of alarms, which cause noise, distraction and overall distur-
bance.[26]
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The majority of alarms in hospital are clinically irrelevant. Studies suggest the
percentage of false alarms is around 80–99%. The main reason behind false alarms
are movement artefacts and incorrect readings. Different studies report slightly
different numbers, but the trend is clear. This means that only about 10% of alarms
are clinically relevant. [26] [32]
Typical alarm systems have high sensitivity but low specificity. This trend can
be observed in both positive and negative predictive values, which are low and high
respectively. A common range for sensitivity and negative predictive value is about
90–99%. In contrast, positive predictive value and specificity are usually 5–27% and
about 50% respectively. [26]
Metric Formula
Sensitivity TP / (TP + FN)
Specificity TN / (TN + FP)
Positive
predictive
value
TP / (TP + FP)
Negative
predictive
value
TN / (TN + FN)
Table 1: Accuracy metric formulas. TP = True positive, TN = True negative, FP =
False positive, FN = False negative
High sensitivity means that alarm systems are extremely sensitive to any abnor-
malities, and therefore almost never miss a real alarm. Low specificity values mean
the system is inaccurate in distinguishing between real and false alarm conditions,
which causes high false alarm rates. Positive and negative predictive values represent
the percentage of true positives and true negatives out of all positives and negatives,
respectively. [26]
The rationale of never wanting to miss a real alarm is clear behind these figures.
However, technical challenges associated with signal acquisition and disturbances in
the measurements are also a contributing factor. [26] [14]
False alarms are typically caused by either technical issues with the system, or
artefacts in the analysed signal. Alarm limits, the alarm itself, and alarm algorithms
can also contribute to false alarms being generated. As the underlying reasons can
be so diverse, so must the classification when evaluating what exactly is false about
the alarm. From a medical point of view, false alarms have two categories:
• False positive: alarms caused by a malfunction or defect in medical equipment.
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Can also be caused by patient activity. For example, SpO2 alarms due to
motion artefacts or a broken sensor.
• Irrelevant: Alarms caused by a correct alarm condition, but which do not have
any clinical relevance and thus require no intervention. They are also called
non-actionable or nuisance alarms. For example, SpO2 alarm with patients
who have constant low blood oxygenation levels. Staff intervention may also
cause these alarms. These alarms are technically true, but clinically false.
The need for clinical action is a good measure for the validity of an alarm. Alarm
are sometimes categorised as actionable or non-actionable, depending on the need
for clinical intervention.[14]
Nuisance alarms, alarms that are technically correct but clinically irrelevant, are
the main problem with current alarm management. Technically false alarms and
intervention alarms are usually resolved by fixing equipment and training staff in its
correct use.
Nuisance alarms, on the other hand, are not so simple to tackle. They arise from
the aforementioned rationale of extreme sensitivity in alarm systems, and therefore
the only way to avoid them would be to change the prevalent alarm logic. This is
more difficult a challenge than it may seem, as medical realities and patient safety
issues quickly arise when contemplating these topics.[14]
Several studies have been conducted on the validity of alarms in both ICU and
low acuity settings. Results of these studies all suggest high false alarm rates.
Studies show that care staff may be subjected to about 150–700 alarms per patient
per day in the ICU and 5–10 in lower acuity settings.[14] [26] [36] When factoring in
the lower nurse to patient ratio of low-acuity wards, it is unfeasible to use similar
alarm criteria as in the ICU environment. [2] The load on clinical staff may become
overwhelming and cause numerous potentially hazardous effects.
2.2.3 Alarm fatigue
Frequent alarms cause a phenomenon called alarm fatigue. A combination of excessive
noise and constant alarms can stress nurses and other care staff to the point of affecting
quality of care negatively. If the alarms generated are also clinically irrelevant, or
false, the effect is amplified.
Nurses often describe their care environments as chaotic and noisy. A cacophonic
and stressful mix of alarms, patients and other care staff. This kind of environment
is difficult for people to be in and makes it difficult for nurses to do their job well.[20]
Alarm fatigue causes an effect called "Crying Wolf", named after a story of a
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shepherd boy who cried "Wolf!" too many times as a joke. One day, when the wolf
actually appeared and the boy again called for help, nobody came to his rescue. The
story teaches that people become easily desensitised because of false alarms, and
stop reacting to alarms correctly, or try to avoid them altogether. [14]
What are the principal effects of alarm fatigue? How does it affect the treatment
of patients? How can it be managed? All of these questions are at the heart of
current clinical monitoring alarm research. Answers are urgently needed.
The main cause for alarm fatigue is simply the huge alarm burden that medical
personnel have to endure. Coupled with low nurse to patient ratios, care staff struggle
to cope with the overwhelming situation. There are simply too many calls to action
for people to respond to. Furthermore, as the majority of alarms are false, nurses lose
faith in the alarm system and become understandably frustrated with it constantly
alarming.[26][14]
This leads to overall desensitisation towards all alarms, which lengthens response
times considerably and often causes personnel to set wider alarm limits, silencing
alarms or even disabling them altogether. While changing alarm limits and disabling
useless alarms is recommended, it must be done without decreasing patient safety.
Overall, it would be better if the system would not require the user to do this too
often.[26]
Longer reaction times and silenced alarms threaten patient safety. The basic
function of the alarm system changes too as care staff bend rules and make up their
own system for dealing with the alarm load. This is necessary from the nurses’ point
of view, but not intended when designing the alarm system. Potentially dangerous
situations may be missed because of these interferences.[14]
Studies done on response times suggest that typical response times are long. Of
course this depends on the hospital environment, more critical care environments
have a much faster reaction time than less critical ones. Alarm severity levels also
affect response times significantly.
The probability that nurses will respond to alarms in under 60 seconds may be as
low as 10%. Common response reaction time in wards is between 1–10 minutes.[4][26]
An example of the dangers of alarm fatigue is a patient who died of cardiac arrest
at a major Boston hospital in January 2010. The patient’s heart rate had begun
decreasing prior to the incident, and an alarm had gone off in the nurses’ central
station. Despite this, care staff didn’t notice anything before a routine check-up later.
A separate crisis alarm at the patient’s bed had also been turned off for unknown
reasons. A report released on the incident suggested "alarm fatigue" contributed to
the death of the patient. [24]
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In total it has been reported that around 200–500 patient deaths have been
related to alarm fatigue between 2005 and 2008. Due to the complex way alarm
fatigue affects care, it is possible that the actual number is higher.[24]
Hospital noise levels are on average around 72 dB during the day and 60 dB at
night. This is much higher than the 40 dB guideline given by the World Health
Organization. While it is unclear how significant a factor alarms are in hospital sound
levels, they are nevertheless strongly associated with causing excessive noise.[31]
Alarm audibility is a serious issue. Too many overlapping alarm sounds and
overall noisiness makes it difficult to distinguish alarm sounds from one another, or
even hear them at all. This is an obvious risk, as sound is a primary way alarms
are transmitted. Studies done in hospital environments suggest that, on average,
clinical staff can correctly identify 50% of alarm sounds. This situation means a
more coherent and coordinated alarm sound system is urgently needed. [4]
Alarm fatigue can be observed in patients as well. The heightened sound levels
caused by constant alarming disturb patient sleep and overall wellbeing. A hospital
is already a stressful place for patients, and additional cacophony and chaos certainly
doesn’t help. A noisy environment and lack of sleep can increase patient stress levels
and worsen their conditions.[17]
Stress has been known to cause multiple adverse effects in humans. Although
the mechanism of action is not perfectly known, stress effects can inhibit immune
system functionality and cause various disorders. People under stress are at greater
risk of getting sick or even dying. [22]
In summary, alarm hazards consist of a causal chain originating from having
too many false alarms, and ending in various adverse effects. These effects can
be observed not only in care staff, but patients as well. [5] The following table
summarises problems, causes, effects and possible solutions to this multi-faceted
issue.
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Problems Causes Effects Solutions
• Irrelevant
alarms
• Noise
• Alarm inter-
preting
• Sensitive
systems
• Simple alarm
logic
• Staff and
patient annoy-
ance
• Low faith in
alarm system
• Increased
response time
• Decreased
safety and
performance
• Better audio
• Smart alarms
• Alarm proto-
cols
• Integration be-
tween alarms
• Alarm configu-
rations
2.2.4 Alarm improvements
It is clear that something needs to be done to improve current alarm characteristics
of monitoring systems. Modern monitor alarms are lagging behind the development
level of other medical technologies by many years. There are many reasons for
this, ranging from technical challenges to legal and regulatory restrictions. [26] [7]
[19] Several solutions have been suggested to combat high false alarm rates. These
methods can be roughly divided into three levels of operation:
1. Technical level (signal acquisition)
2. Alarm logic level (alarm generation)
3. Alarm validation level (alarm validation)
The first level deals with sensor technology and how the actual measurement
is done. After sensor contact, the parameter is typically filtered somehow as well.
Improving the system at this level means developing better sensor technologies and
filtering strategies.
The second level is where the alarm state is evaluated. Common monitoring
systems use a simple threshold, which triggers the alarm. Pattern recognition is used
for arrhythmia monitoring. Asystole of apnoea states are determined by the pause
time of events, beats and breaths, respectively.
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The third level is the validation of the alarm against some other criteria. The
simplest case is no validation at all, which means alarms are activated instantly.
Typical systems apply some time delay for actually sounding the alarm. Multivariate
alarm methods may compare parameter values together to validate an alarm state.
For example, heart rate and pulse rate may be compared to determine heartbeat
frequency.[26] Proposed methods for improving alarm behaviour can be further
divided into two principal categories:
1. Technological
• Technical sensor improvements: improves measurement accuracy
• Statistical methods: Mean- or median-filtering, linear trend approximation,
regression analysis, artifact filtering.
• Autoregressive models and self adjusting thresholds: Low order AR models
for physiologic variable modelling.
• Phase-space embedding: Parameter time series transformation to phase-
space models.
• Trend detection and curve fitting: Trend detection, dimension reduction
for multivariate data.
• Artificial intelligence: Knowledge-approach, machine learning, fuzzy logic,
bayesian networks, neural networks.
2. Hospital protocols
• Alarm response protocols: Alarm management, care staff knowledge of
alarms.
• User configuration of alarms: Patient customisation, criticality settings,
optimal settings.
• Proper use of medical equipment: Medical device positioning, alarm
management, patient context.
• Standardisation and coordination of alarms: Eliminating redundancies,
alarm standards.
Methods from both categories are applied in this work, focusing mostly on
configurations and statistical methods for false alarm reduction. The alarms evaluated
in this work are univariate threshold alarms (except apnoea and technical alarms),
so experimenting is limited to configuring thresholds, delays and averaging.
2.3 Alarm configurations
When determining optimal configurations for a clinical monitoring alarm system,
many physiological and medical issues must be taken into consideration. This thesis
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aims at finding optimal solutions for minimising false alarm rate without missing
clinically relevant alarms. As a result, patient safety is improved.
The main factors considered are alarm thresholds, alarm generation delays and
averaging filter lengths. While these can be viewed as three separate factors, they also
contribute to one singular question: If something changes, how long until an alarm
is triggered, if at all?. All three factors basically move the alarm generation trigger
further away from normal values. We can therefore construct a relative measure for
the total delay of the alarm. First, it takes time for the vital parameter to reach the
alarm threshold. Second, the absolute amount of delay for the alarm to trigger is
added to that time. Third, parameter value averaging effectively lengthens threshold
violation time as well. Of course we must also view threshold, delay, and averaging
as separate factors when determining optimal configurations. However, the total
delay compound measure is a handy tool for modelling the effect of different alarm
configurations. It is relative, which means that a base level must be first set before
calculating it.
Some vital sign values change differently than others. Respiration rate and heart
rate changes can be so quick that modelling them impossible and unnecessary, and
therefore the alarm limit’s effect on total delay is negligible. In a crisis, they may
change instantly, unlike SpO2 which is slower and monotonic. Blood oxygenation
level has a relatively low change rate measured in seconds per unit, which makes it
possible to derive models of blood desaturation during apnoea or insufficient oxygen
supply. A model was developed by A.D. Farmery and P.G. Roe on blood oxygen
desaturation rate during apnoea. From it we can derive that it takes about four
seconds for a 1 unit drop in SpO2, 2 seconds for post-op or obese individuals. Children
have a faster rate as well. Figure 2.3 shows a graph of the desaturation model.The
model is used in the practical section of this work. [1]
Figure 2: Blood oxygen desaturation rate [1]
There have been numerous studies on how changing these factors affects alarm
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behaviour, and they suggest that even with relatively small relaxations of alarm
settings, significant alarm burden reductions can be achieved. However, patient
safety issues often arise if settings are relaxed too much, and different results may
conflict.
This thesis only covers pulse oximetry and respiratory monitoring, so all electro-
cardiograph related alarms are left out. Without ECG-events, the bulk of the alarm
burden seems to be pulse oximeter related, and other studies confirm this.[9] [15]
Most studies focus on the SpO2 alarm, which is more common than the pulse rate or
respiratory rate alarm. However, the underlying principles of configuring the alarm
are the same, and can be applied to all alarms. Usually its a question of either safe
thresholds or accepted time of violation. Common thresholds for SpO2, pulse rate
and respiratory rate are:
Table 2: Common alarm thresholds
SpO2 (%) PR (bpm) RR (bpm)
Low 90 50 8
High N/A 150 35
Common thresholds and alarm rates for SpO2, pulse rate and respiratory rate
are shown in Table 2. Some hospital protocols allow alarm thresholds to be varied
by the user, others do not. Changing thresholds enables clinical staff to adapt
settings for each patient. For example, patients with continuously low blood oxygen
saturation may need to have alarm thresholds changed in order to avoid false alarms.
Alarm settings have been defined using medical knowledge of normal ranges and
patient population observations. Figure 2.3 shows typical distributions of parameter
values. It it hard to define universally valid limits for these vital signs, especially
with different patients and criticality levels. [11]
A study by James Welch et al yields plenty of results on the effects of threshold
and delay changes. A large multi-parameter database was collected and used for
simulating alarm behaviour depending on various settings. The database contained
94 575 hours of patient data. Results suggested that false alarm rates could be
reduced significantly by changing configurations. The study concluded that low
alarm rates could be achieved by selecting alarm limits as the 0.5–1.0% points of
the parameter value distribution ends, depending on desired limit. Delays should
be chosen so that quickly resolving violations are not evaluated as alarms. Delays
ranged from 0 to 120 seconds. The methodology used in this study proved to be
viable for data-driven optimisation and development of patient monitoring alarm
systems.[8] [28]
Other studies seem to report similar results on the effects of threshold and delay
configuring. Alarm were often reduced by over 50% and up to 90% with some
configurations. Delays and averaging seem to have a stronger effect than thresholds
only. This may be due to the small and brief nature of threshold violations. The
18
Figure 3: Parameter value distributions from different studies [8]
parameter value drops or jumps suddenly out of the limits for a short period of time.
This can be effectively countered by delaying triggering of the alarm. [6] Usually
these brief threshold violations can be physiologically normal states that correct
themselves quickly. Artefacts may also cause brief violations.
In summary, most pursuits for reducing false alarm burden suggest lowering limits,
settings delays, and averaging the parameter value. How these configurations should
be made is another matter. One study suggested having default alarm settings, of
which nurses could tweak limits by 10%. Further adjustments would have to be
approved by physicians.[3] Delay and averaging changes done by users were not
suggested in any studies. However, clinical staff can often silence alarms for a short
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period or completely. This is normal and helps reduce irrelevant alarms that are
caused by treatment.[14]
2.4 Monitoring parameters
The most common vital measurements monitored are pulse oximetry, electrocardiog-
raphy, blood pressure and respiration. The monitoring system used while making
this thesis is limited to pulse oximetry and respiratory monitoring.
2.4.1 Pulse oximetry
Pulse oximetry is a noninvasive method for measuring blood oxygen saturation and
pulse rate. It provides two important vital sign parameters: SpO2 and heart pulse
rate. SpO2 is arterial oxygen saturation (SaO2) measured by pulse oximeter. Actual
SaO2 value may vary slightly, and is only measured accurately by sampling the blood
itself. The SpO2 value is generally correlated well enough to SaO2 that it can be
used in clinical monitoring as a vital parameter of patient status. Pulse rate is a
measurement of arterial blood pulses, which result from heart beats. Pulse rate is
usually the same as heart rate, which is derived from the electrical activity of the
heart. Some arrhythmias may cause the two parameters to behave differently, which
is why monitoring both is useful.[29]
Blood saturation measurements are based on the principle of different absorption
spectra of oxyhaemoglobin and reduced haemoglobin. Typically two wavelengths
of light are used for the measurement, red and infrared are the most common.
The absorption of these two wavelengths after transmission through the skin is
measured. This is called plethysmographic signal, from which SpO2 and pulse rate
are extracted.[29]
Pulse oximetry sensors are highly sensitive to motion artefacts, incident ambient
light and other disturbances. The extracted plethysmographic signal can be very
noisy, and parameter values may change rapidly. When the signal is normal, however,
pulse oximetry is a very reliable and good measurement. Because it’s non-invasive,
pulse oximetry is an easy parameter to monitor and does not obstruct the patient
too much either. It is therefore suitable for continuous monitoring as well.[29]
2.4.2 Respiratory monitoring
Respiratory rate and gas exchange monitoring can be performed with multiple
different techniques. These can be divided into three groups:
20
• Direct methods: these methods measure respiratory gas flow directly. For
example, capnography, where the CO2 concentration of respiratory gas is
measured with a nasal cannula.
• Indirect methods: measurement is done by looking at other physiological
changes in the body associated with respiration. For example, impedance
pneumography, where impedance changes over the chest are measured to get
respiration rate.
• Derived methods: these methods use physiological signals primarily meant for
other measurements, and extracts information that can be further processed to
derive respiratory rate. An example is ECG-derived respiration.
The monitoring system tested in this thesis is based on the second group.
Impedance pneumography is the base technology applied. The measurement is
based on the principle that the impedance over the chest area is modulated by
respiration. Electrodes are used to measure impedance, and the resulting signal
is analysed and respiration rate is determined from it. Impedance respiration is
extremely susceptible to movement artefacts, but provides a practical and unobstruc-
tive method for measuring respiratory rate. Therefore it is also suited for continuous
monitoring.[30] [13]
2.5 Mathematical optimisation
This section briefly covers basic concepts of mathematical optimisation. First,
different optimisation problems are characterised. Then, common optimisation
techniques are discussed. This section supports the decision about which optimisation
technique is applied in the practical part of this work. More detailed information on
algorithms that were considered and eventually chosen for this thesis in section 3.7.
2.5.1 Optimisation problems
Optimisation problems are ubiquitous in any engineering field. The goal is typically
either minimising or maximising a function value. The general definition for an
optimisation problem is:
minimise
x
f0(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
There are many different characteristics that define an optimisation problem.
These qualities may also limit the use of some optimisation methods. They range from
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real-world limitations to purely mathematical aspects. The most basic definitions of
an optimisation problem are:
• Constraints
• Linearity
• Discrete or continuous
• Static or dynamic
• Dimension of input
• Dimension of output
Constraints limit the search space, and must therefore be taken into account when
solving the problem. Solutions outside the constrained space are not determined. The
linearity of a problem must also be considered, as non-linear functions tend to have
local optimums, which makes it more difficult for optimisers to converge on a global
optimum. Whether the solution space is discrete or continuous matters too, and
limits the ways in which new candidate solutions can be generated. The difference
between static and dynamic problems is that the latter changes over time, which
means the optimiser must provide an optimal sequence to the problem. For static
problems this is not the case. Input dimension adds to search space size. Output
dimension refers to the number of targets to be optimised, which adds complexity to
the problem.[33]
2.5.2 Optimisation techniques
Below are listed some common optimisation techniques:
• Convex optimisation: Objective function and constraints are convex.
• Integer programming: Some or all input variables are integers.
• Nonlinear programming: Part of the problem is nonlinear.
• Stochastic programming: Function or inputs include random elements.
• Combinatorial optimisation: Set of feasible solutions is discrete.
• Heuristics and metaheuristics: Few assumptions are made on the problem,
optimal is sought by educated guess , optimum is not guaranteed to be found.
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The ability to use a technique depends on the problem at hand. If the problem
can be represented in a convex way, convex optimisation may be used. Linearity
and other problem characteristics also shape the technique used for solving it. Most
optimisation techniques rely on formulating the objective function and constraints
mathematically, and applying various operations on them, like differentiation. Also,
if the problem is continuous, it is possible to use mathematical methods to determine
which way to look the the optimum. An example of this is the gradient descent
method. However, if a problem cannot be represented in this way, or is not continuous,
we may have to rely simply on making educated guesses for the optimums. This is
where heuristics are useful, and many hard problems have to be solved by heuristic
optimisation techniques.[21]
2.5.3 Multi-objective optimisation
Problems which have multiple targets to be optimised are not only more complex
than single target problems, but also don’t have a singular optimum value. Instead,
the optimum is a combination of the output values. This solution set can be further
processed in a set of dominate solutions, which is known as a Pareto optimal solution
set. These solutions are optimal in the sense, that there is no way of improving one
target without worsening the other. In the simplest two-dimensional example, we
have a line which represents the optimal combinations of the two variables. The final
decision is always a trade off, and additional rules are needed to determine which
combination is chosen. These rules may include hierarchical ordering of the targets,
or using a weighted sum for choosing the optimum. [34] [10]
Figure 4: Pareto front of optimal solutions [37]
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3 Materials and Methods
This chapter is about the materials and research methods used in this thesis. Hospital
test data is analysed and descriptive statistics calculated from it. Alarm behaviour
baselines are also shown in this chapter. All material used in this thesis comes
from hospital tests, apart from the algorithms themselves, which are developed
on site. Hospital material can be divided into raw patient data, vital sign data,
alarm data and nurse annotations. The first three are relatively straightforward
and are used mainly as is. Nurse annotation data is subject to human-factor effects,
which contribute to possible variation, inconsistency and incompleteness of the data.
Annotations were eventually reviewed a second time, as inconsistencies with testing
protocols were detected.
The main goal of the work was to create a development platform for analysing
and optimising the alarm behaviour of the clinical patient monitoring system. The
developed platform offers capability to annotate hospital test data, rerun said data
with different algorithm versions and system settings, and producing various results
and analysing those results further. Main outputs are overall alarm statistics and
optimised configurations results. The platform can also be used for investigating
problems within the system. It is a tool for both low level development work and
higher level system evaluation.
3.1 Hospital data
Hospital data consisted of multiple signals, trends and logs. During hospital tests,
the monitoring system collects all patient data and derived parameter values with
logs. This data is first saved on the monitoring device itself. After the test case,
the data is transferred from the monitor to a computer. The data is subsequently
transferred to a local engineering database, where it is preprocessed before being
analysed by the testing framework. The data used by the testing framework is listed
below.
1. Raw signal data
• Composite plethysmograph (100 Hz, absorption)
• Electrocardiograph (500 Hz, mV )
• Impedance pneumograph (125 Hz, mOhm)
2. Parameter trend data
• SpO2 (1 Hz, %)
• Pulse rate (1 Hz, beats per minute)
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• Respiratory rate (1 Hz, breaths per minute)
3. Log data
• Alarm log (1 hz, active alarms)
3.2 Patient population
Clinical tests were conducted at Helsinki University Hospital in Meilahti, Helsinki.
Patiets were being treated in three different wards: Emergency Ward, Vascular
Surgical Ward, and Cardiac Surgical Ward.
There were 70 patients enrolled in the study. Of those, 63 were adults and
58 of those were included in the study. Three enrolled patients refused the study
afterwards. Other reasons for data exclusion were corrupted data and experimental
testing protocols which were not studied further. Child patient data (n = 7) is
treated separately, and may be used in future studies.
Data used for evaluation was in total 118.2 hours. Patient gender distribution was
79.3 % male, 20.7 % female. Descriptive statistics of patient age, height and weight
are shown in table 3. Patient distribution between the three wards was: emergency
ward (n = 27), vascular surgical ward (n = 11), and cardiac surgical ward (n = 20).
No adverse effects were recorded during the study.
Hospital tests were conducted with one or two research nurses per case for
reducing possible variation between testing staff. Some variation may still exist due
to cases with only one testing nurse. A thorough review of test results was conducted
afterwards, which aimed at reducing variance of results between different testing
staff.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of patient population
Patient info (n = 58) Mean Median SD
Age 61.48 64.0 13.83
Height 174.40 175.5 8.17
Weight 80.68 79.0 79.0
3.3 Development platform overview
The platform and processes used for research and development in this thesis have
three main phases of operation. First, patient data is collected during hospital tests.
Alarm behaviour is annotated by clinical specialists on-site, and all the data is then
transferred to the engineering database.
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Second, system monitor algorithms are compiled as MATLAB MEX functions,
which enables the algorithms to be run within the development framework in MAT-
LAB as mostly black-box functions. The annotated alarm log is further post processed
and reviewed into a reference for correct alarm behaviour.
Third, the original patient data from the hospital is rerun on the platform with
different algorithm versions or system settings. The parameter values and alarms from
this run are then compared against the reference data and final results are produced.
The system offers high flexibility in analysing results further. An optimisation
framework built around the base functionality of the system can be used to find
optimal configurations for alarm configuration settings.
Figure 3.3 displays the high level structure of the entire system. The practical
work done in this thesis is mainly focused on Phase II and Phase III sections in
the diagram, namely data rerunning and optimisation against references, finally
producing statistics and optimised configurations.
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Figure 5: High level platform structure
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3.4 Hospital data annotation
The monitoring system is being tested in Helsinki University Hospital in Meilahti,
Helsinki. The tests produce a lot of different data ranging from usability results to
raw patient vital signals. For the purposes of this work, the most relevant data are
raw patient data, calculated parameter values and alarm logs. Overall system logs
are also collected for debugging purposes.
3.4.1 Hospital tests
Hospital tests were typically 2.5 - 3 hours long, on average 2.7 hours. Due to various
experimental procedures and test scenarios, some test cases were not fully analysed in
terms of alarm behaviour, and are therefore truncated by a specific time interval. For
example, the pulse oximetry probe was tested at multiple different locations, some of
which weren’t as good as others. Other anomalies during testing were also discarded.
These included hardware-related problems and various test protocol abnormalities
especially in the first phases of system testing. Taking intervals into consideration
test cases time mean was 2.0 hours.
Tests were conducted in three different wards and with different patients. See 3.1
for more information. Patients can be both bedridden or ambulatory, and the system
is tested during patient transport as well. For algorithm and alarms development it
is important to collect data from many different monitoring scenarios, which gives a
more holistic picture its actual use environment.
3.4.2 Alarm event annotations
The collected patient data is sent back from the hospital as is. The system alarm log,
however, is more scrutinised. Clinical specialists on site use a tablet computer with
an annotation program to annotate any alarm situation that the system under test
may report. This first phase annotation program was developed by René Coffeng at
GE Healthcare. It produces timestamped events which contain various information.
The test nurses are able to add anything of interest to the annotation log file. This file
uses a specific format, which enables the MATLAB framework to automatically read
and parse it, extracting the required data. Typically, the annotated log contained
information on the patient’s physical context, activity or overall state. Reference
measurements were also conducted to compare with the monitors own measurements.
Lastly, the log contained annotations for alarm situations that happened during the
testing period.
Alarm events are classified into six categories with the following criteria:
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Table 4: Classification of alarm events and their explanations
Class Definition
True Clinically relevant andactionable alarm.
False
Technically incorrect alarm,
caused by malfunction or
wrong measurement.
Possible
Alarm condition correct,
clinical relevance depends
on preference.
Irrelevant
Alarm condition correct,
but clinically irrelevant
and non-actionable.
N/A
Caused by testing protocols or
interventions.
Left out of analysis.
Unknown
Alarm cause unknown,
should be investigated.
Left out of analysis.
For optimisation purposes, only True, False, Possible, and Irrelevant are important.
"Not applicable" and "Unknown" classes are diagnostic classes used to discard events
completely or prompt further investigation, respectively. If the cause of an Unknown
alarm remains unclear, it was left out from the optimisation process, but added to
the final alarm statistics as such.
Classes True, False, Possible and Irrelevant are used for both analysis and opti-
misation by the system. The main factors differentiating the classes is the type of
clinical action needed and technical correctness of the alarm. The required action may
range from heightened awareness of the patient’s status to a physical intervention.
In the end, the classification depends on the nurse’s interpretation of the event.
The difference between classes True and Possible is that the latter may be viewed
as useful, even though it doesn’t prompt further clinical intervention. True cases
always prompt intervention. For this study, alarms were annotated True only if
testing nurses felt they had to intervene somehow with the treatment of the patient, or
if clinical intervention was required following an alarm. Alarms classified as Possible
were cases where the alarm condition was correct, and deemed clinically relevant.
These situations did not have to prompt an immediate response or change in therapy.
However, they were considered clinically relevant in the sense that they reflected the
patient’s health status and provided valuable information. This process is better
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explained in section 3.4.3
In this thesis, results are presented as two system profiles, sensitive and insensitive,
which regard possible alarm as useful alarms or nuisance alarms, respectively. In
practice, the sensitive profile considers Possible alarms strictly required, while the
Insensitive profile only requires True alarms. Table 5 illustrates how the classes relate
to clinical and technical relevance.
Table 5: Matrix of clinical relevance and alarm classes
Relevant Irrelevant
Clinically True/Possible False/Possible/Irrelevant
Technically True/Possible/Irrelevant False
These categories are used to create statistics of the system’s alarm behaviour.
The difference between the classes is quite fuzzy, and it is understandably difficult to
reach a consensus. In fact, annotations had to be reviewed again during the study.
Different interpretations of defined classes led to changing annotation procedures,
which had to be reviewed again to achieve a more consistent testing protocol. As
testing matured, annotations were more in line with definitions. Unclear annotation
cases were reviewed again and a final decision was reached. Guidelines for annotations
were given to clinical specialists prior to testing. These included the definitions in
table 4, excluding the Possible class, which was applied to annotations using the
questionnaire mentioned in the next section. However, even with the guidelines,
alarm classification is often subjective.
During development, different stakeholders and parties may even disagree on the
right answer, which complicates things further. It is, however, the nature of life
sciences to be inexact at times. The common goal is still to maximise patient safety.
There are numerous factors in this equation, which makes any solution a compromise
of sorts.
3.4.3 Annotation review process
The first round of annotations can be challenging, especially if the system reports
multiple alarms with high frequency. The nurse might also need to tend to the
patient or system hardware, which might cause incomplete annotations for some
alarms. This indeed happened frequently, especially in early stages of testing. To
combat this, a second two-stage annotation round is done offline after the test has
terminated. The system does some automatic preprocessing and heuristic analysis
on the annotations in order to correctly complete the log, but user input is often
required nonetheless.
For these purposes, the platform offers a simple Microsoft Excel and PDF workflow
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for reviewing online annotations. Users can look at each alarm event separately with
annotations and parameter waveforms around that specific event displayed. Once the
annotations are completely filled, the system post-processes the completed log into a
reference file ready for comparison. Figure 3.4.3 shows an example of the annotation
process. The second round of annotations improved the situation by filling gaps in
the annotations and yielding a complete reference for the system to analyse.
Figure 6: Example snippet from annotation the tool
A final step was taken in order to finalise annotations. Nurses were asked about
situations where they had to intervene somehow. During the test case, the research
nurse is not supposed to treat the patient in any clinical way, but only focus on the
equipment under test and test protocols. However, if a clinically relevant situation
arises which may indicate a potential adverse situation, the testing nurse will intervene
if others haven’t done so already. This questionnaire resulted in one single event
where the research nurse informed care staff about a physiological alarm, which led
clinical action. This single event was the only clinically relevant and actionable alarm
recorded during the study.
Alarm events which were originally classified as clinically relevant were renamed
possible, and used as constraints for the aforementioned sensitivity profiles of the
system.
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3.5 Algorithm compilation
The algorithms used in the patient monitoring systems are written in either C or C++
programming languages. They are compiled for the target hardware architecture,
either the monitor itself or a sensor. In order to execute the algorithms on the
development platform, they are compiled as MATLAB MEX functions, which can be
executed as normal functions from MATLAB. The platform automatically compiles
both the original algorithm libraries and MATLAB MEX functions. The algorithms
are not touched after this, and apart from some input parameters upon function
calling, they are a black-box from the system’s point of view.
3.6 Platform structure
The development platform itself is a collection of MATLAB functions. System
execution is semi-automatic or automatic, depending on the required action. This
ensures flexibility and enables easy debugging of possible problems. Most information
is saved during system execution, within space and convenience limits. It is therefore
possible to monitor system behaviour across the entire data path. This functionality
is invaluable for debugging purposes and also for more in-depth analysis of test cases
and algorithm malfunction.
3.6.1 Typical workflow
Typical system workflow begins with defining execution settings and data in the
main configuration file. The platform offers extensive configuration options and also
a sweep capability across multiple settings values, which is useful for comparing
different settings. After configuration, and provided that hospital reference data
and raw patient data is available, the run is executed automatically and results are
returned to the user.
3.6.2 System output
There are two principal outputs of the system. The first is overall alarm behaviour,
which is reported as a table and various graphical visualisations. The second is
information about optimal settings as calculated by the optimisation framework, see
the next section. Optimisation results are partly reported visually as well.
The system also records intermediate results and data for each test case. This
can be accessed in MATLAB for more in-depth analysis of possible anomalies in
the algorithms or patient data. Additionally, the system features some specialised
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reporting tools for visualising test case specific alarm behaviour and results for sweep
runs. Below is a list of the main data outputs of the system:
1. Statistical results
• Descriptive statistics of data
• Alarm rates categorised as required
• Accuracy values
2. Graphics
• Histograms
• Bar charts
• Tradeoff pareto plots
• Alarm rate surfaces
• Heatmaps of alarm occurrences
3.7 Optimisation
The main goal of the optimisation is to find optimal settings for the system. The
main settings to be optimised are alarm limits, delays, and filtering configurations.
Alarm limits and delays are the two most influential factors to alarm behaviour.
Moving averaging is applied to each parameter, and can affect the end results as well.
On the other hand, the total delay applied to generating the alarm must also be kept
small enough in order to ensure patient safety. This makes the optimisation problem
multi-objective, and means that any solution is a compromise between alarm count
and applied delay. The algorithm result is a trade off plot with a pareto-line, showing
best possible combinations of both targets. These results should be interpreted and
applied, taking clinical requirements into consideration.
There are some algorithm specific inputs that could be optimised as well, but
this system is not perfectly suitable for that, as it’s only working against alarm
count, which is not accurate enough for optimising them. The effect of varying said
parameters would probably be too small and inaccurate to actually find optimal
solutions. Algorithm developers are better suited at tuning those, as they can go
down to signal and parameter value level and compare those with similar references.
The framework is capable of analysing signal level differences, but for the scope of
this study, it was left out of the optimisation process. Alarm related behaviour of
signals is evaluated, however, and threshold violation statistics are reported.
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3.7.1 Target functions
The optimisation framework uses two target functions, one for alarm count and one
for optimising values related to the input configurations, i.e. alarm limit, delay, and
averaging. These input parameters are denoted in the following functions as l, d,
and a, respectively. Other variables used are parameter defaults and constraints
such as maximum delay, and limitRange, the size of the threshold search space. The
targets are therefore alarm count and applied total delay to alarm generation. The
multi-objective optimisation problem is then scalarised to a single function as a
weighted sum of the two target functions. The final optimisation problem is defined
as follows:
minimize w1f1(l, d, a) + w2f2(l, d, a)
subject to l, d, a ∈ N,
f2 ≤ maxDelay,
l ≤ lmax,
l ≥ lmin,
d ≤ dmax,
d ≥ dmin,
a ≤ amax,
a ≥ amin,
No Missed Alarms
(1)
The problem is a constrained weighted sum that needs to be minimised. The
primary target function is essentially the process of taking patient parameter signals
from the algorithms and applying filtering and alarm evaluation to them. The
output is alarm count, which should be minimised. The first function also evaluates
inputs against constraints, mainly search space and system sensitivity profile. There
is also a constraint for maximum delay value, which is calculated in different ways for
different vital parameters. The formulas are shown below. The constraint for system
sensitivity profile is evaluated against the number of Possible alarms. In practice,
the sensitive profile treats Possible alarms as True alarms, and does not allow any to
be missed.
Constraints on input parameters and their combinations are used as safeguards
when the amount of annotated alarms is not large enough. If there were plenty of
True and Possible alarms, they would not be needed to limit optimiser. The weights
can also be used to control the movements of the optimiser.
The first target function is defined as follows:
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f1(limit, delay, averaging) = nalarms (2)
The second target function calculates the total delay applied to alarm generation,
which should also be minimised. This calculation is different for the SpO2 alarm,
because the limit value can be embedded in the total delay (the SpO2 value change
over time model). With other alarms, the total delay is first only calculated from
delay and averaging values (to be checked against maximum delay constraints). The
effect of the limit is added afterwards, to be used by the optimiser for choosing
potentially narrower limits, if possible. The total delay variable is multiplied with a
weight in order to reduce its size compared to alarm count. This is done to emphasise
the effect of alarm count in the weighted sum to be optimised. In the function
definition, the weights are the maxDelay and limitRange variables, these can be
altered if needed. More on the weights used later in this section. The total delay
function is defined as follows:
f2spo2(l, d, a) = (4 ∗ (l − ldefault) + d+ a/2)/maxDelay (3)
f2others(l, d, a) = (d+ a/2)/maxDelay+
(l − ldefault)/limitRange
(4)
These functions are given to the annealing algorithm. A separate wrapper was
created on top of this core functionality, which serves as helper for applying search-
space constraints and other heuristic controllers. The annealing function itself runs
inside the wrapper, and results are output from it as well. See the pseudocode below
for the annealing algorithm. The weights are applied inside the functions. Different
weights were tested for the delay measure, to see how much they affected the end
result of the optimisation. Increasing the weight on the second function increased
the number of alarms but reduced the applied delay. There is no right answer as to
which value is correct, the solution is always a trade off.
It seems that weights around 1/4 and 1/2 caused the optimiser to move towards
minimising the delay value more, while smaller weights clearly caused alarm count
to be minimised first. In the end, the weights were chosen so that alarm count is
given more emphasis. With f1 the weight is 1, and the f2 weight is either the inverse
of SpO2 maximum delay or inverse of total delay and inverse of the limit range.
Different weights for the target functions could be used to create different profiles
for the end system, and could make the system sensitivity profiles more nuanced.
The outputs of the target functions are alarm count, total relative delay. The
two outputs are the main multi-objective optimisation outputs, which are used to
create optimal solutions. Alarm count is simply the number of alarms produced with
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the settings. Total relative delay was calculated relative to default settings. It’s
formula depended on the parameter. Specifically, with SpO2 the threshold effect is
added to the total delay during calculation, based on the oxygenation drop model
mentioned in section 2. For other parameters, only delay and averaging are used
at first. To bring the effect of changing the limit also the the second relative delay
value, it is simply added afterwards. This is because the delay value is first checked
against maximum delay constraint, and only after is it evaluated by the algorithm.
Constraint checks are done within the functions, and it violated, the function returns
a very large value, which makes it impossible for the optimiser to choose it as a
feasible solution.
To differentiate between sensitive and insensitive system profiles, an additional
constraint is added that all also all possible alarms need to be detected. This could
have been done with a third target function for possible alarms, but because of
the absolute requirement of not wanting to miss any possible alarms, this was not
necessary.
3.7.2 Methods
The optimisation problem had many characteristics that had to be taken into account
when choosing a suitable optimisation method. The most restrictive were the non-
differentiable target function, integer solution space, and non-linearity. Traditional
optimisation methods such as gradient descent and simplex algorithm could not be
applied in this situation. Heuristic methods like genetic algorithms and simulated
annealing were considered, and the latter chosen because of simple implementation
even for multi-objective problems.
The calculation for optimal solutions was not time-sensitive in this project. This
means that brute force sweeping is also a viable option for solving the optimisation
problem. If there were more parameters to be optimised, the situation would be
radically different. A larger data set would also affect running time, but only linearly.
Brute force sweep was also applied to the problem, yielding a perfect solution. This
result could be used as a reference for the simulated annealing algorithm.
Simulated annealing is a probabilistic optimisation algorithm that applies heuris-
tics for accelerating and improving the optimisation process. It is defined as a
metaheuristic algorithm. The main principle is based on metallurgical processes,
where metals are treated in order to alter their physical properties. Annealing is a
heat-treatment process which eventually cool down metals. The algorithm can be
configured with various stopping criteria and other settings, which can affect the end
results. Being a probabilistic search-algorithm, increasing the number of iterations
usually yields better solutions. Below is a pseudocode example of the simulated
annealing process used in this study. The main inputs are the number of maximum
iterations, which can be broken down into different sub-iterations, the first guessed
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solution, which may affect the speed of convergence, and the cooling schedule, which
may also affect the speed of convergence.
T ← T0
S ← S0
oldcost← loss(S)
while niter ≥ nmax do
T ← temperature(coolingschedule)
Snew ← neighbourhood(S, T )
newcost← loss(Snew)
newcost2← loss2(Snew)
delta← costDiff(oldcost, newcost, oldcost2, newcost2)
if delta > 0 then
S ← Snew
oldcost← newcost
oldcost2← newcost2
else
if P (delta, T ) ≥ rand(0, 1) then
S ← Snew
oldcost← newcost
oldcost2← newcost2
end if
end if
end while
The annealing heuristic is mainly used for enabling the algorithm to jump out of
local minima. It is based on the idea of possibly accepting a worse solution in order
to search in a different location of the solution space. The probability with which a
worse solution is chosen is calculated as:
P = e−∆Cost/T (5)
The probability of accepting a worse solution decreases as the temperature cools
down. Other heuristics have been tailored for the specific needs of this problem. First,
step size is determined by temperature and size of the search space in each dimension.
The size of the step in each dimension is proportional to the total dimension size
and scaled by the current annealing temperature. The cooler it is, the shorter steps
are taken. The outputs of the two target functions, alarm count and total delay, are
handled differently, giving precedence to alarm count. This focuses the search to
areas where the alarm count is small enough. When comparing the new cost to the
old one, the total delay difference is weighted differently from alarm count, which
limits its effect to cases where the alarm count does not change or changes very little.
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3.7.3 Challenges
The main challenges with the optimisation were related to step sizes and overall
computation time. The target function was computationally costly, taking about
1.5 – 2.0 seconds per iteration. This meant that the number of iterations had to
be balanced with the optimality of the result. Any stopping criteria applied to the
algorithm is a compromise. By favouring the alarm count result of the algorithm, it
was possible to direct the search towards lower alarm counts more quickly, which
saved time. Adaptive step-size also enabled the algorithm to find optimal regions
quicker, which ensured a better result. The running time of the algorithm could
be anything from two minutes to two hours, depending on selected search criteria.
As the main benefit of this method was speed, it was often used as a quick tool for
determining optimal configurations for a particular alarm.
Choosing the weights for the weighted sum factors was also challenging. The
decision is largely based on clinical preference and trial-and-error testing of different
weights. As mentioned above, using different weights allows us to guide the optimiser
towards different solutions. In this case, it was chosen to prioritise alarm count, and
give delay minimisation less emphasis. Other constraints were used for controlling
the total delay value from growing too much.
Cross validation was applied in order to see how the optimiser results depended
on the data. The leave-one-out (LOO) method was used, which runs the optimisation
over the combinations of data where one item is left out. Results gave some estimate
to the range of the optimal solution space given by the optimisation process. Section
4.2.1 shows the results of this cross-validation. Only the ranges of limits, delays and
averaging lengths are shown, as they had the largest impact on the alarm counts.
Principal component analysis and correlation analysis were also applied to the input
variables and results, in order to determine which inputs correlate most with the end
results.
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4 Results
This section presents the principal results of this study and thesis. First, the alarm
statistics obtained with default settings are presented. Other interesting statistics on
the alarm behaviour of the system are shown as well. Finally, effects of configuring
and optimising the alarm configurations are explained.
4.1 Alarm statistics
The test system provided a plethora of different results. The most useful of which
were simple alarm counts and rates per patient per day. All results were further
subcategorised by either alarm type, parameter, test case, or any required category.
Alarm statistics were first calculated with factory default settings for the system,
and can be viewed as a baseline for the system’s alarm behaviour. The default settings
for clinical alarms are shown in table 6. Total alarm rates and their descriptive
statistics are displayed in table 7.
Table 6: Factory default alarm configuration
Parameter (unit) Limits Delays (s) Averaging (s)
SpO2 (%) 90 – 30 10
SpO2 critical (%) 85 – 10 (0*) 10
Pulse Rate (bpm) 50 – 150 30 10
Respiratory rate (bpm) 6 – 35 30 10
Apnoea (s) 20 0 0
Check Probe N/A 25 0
Probe Off N/A 30 0
* SpO2 critical alarm delay is zero if SpO2 alarm is active
Table 7: Alarm rate with defaults. Total alarm rate is for all patients combined.
Mean, median and standard deviation is between patients.
Statistic Value (n/day)
Alarm rate 47.6
Mean 41.3
Median 6.4
Standard deviation 90.9
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Table 8: Rates of alarms by class
Alarm rate ( n / day) Total* Relevant Possible Irrelevant False
SpO2 low 13.4 0.2 3.5 0.8 6.5
SpO2 critical 10.6 0.2 1.8 0.2 4.7
Pr low 9.1 0.0 5.3 0.2 2.8
Pr high 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Rr low 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Rr high 2.8 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.4
Apnoea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Check probe 9.3 0.0 0.4 0.8 8.3
Probe off 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0
Clinical 36.9 0.4 13.0 1.8 15.4
Technical 10.7 0.0 0.6 0.9 9.3
Total 47.6 0.4 13.6 3.7 24.7
* Alarms classified as unknown are added to total rates.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of alarms and classes. It is important to note, that
the possible class is ambiguous in nature, meaning that the alarm might have been
useful in some circumstances, depending on the system sensitivity profile mentioned
in section 3.4.2.
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Figure 7: Alarms and classes distribution
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With default settings, the system generated lots of clinically irrelevant alarms.
This was expected, as clinical monitor systems tend to be configured to be very
sensitive to alarm conditions. Alarm statistics results suggested most false alarms
were caused by the pulse oximetry measurement. Impedance respiration was much
less prone to cause false alarms. Technical false alarms were only generated by the
pulse oximetry probe. Figure 8 summarises alarm behaviour of all test cases. It
seems that some patients did not produce any alarms, while other produced a lot.
The overall alarm burden is largely due to some patients producing numerous alarms.
This was expected, as patients tend to either cause little to no alarm burden, or
the opposite. The underlying distribution is fat-tailed, almost exponential, which
suggests the bulk of the population is similar to each other, while few individuals are
very different.
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Figure 8: Alarm rates for each test case subcategorised by parameter
4.1.1 Alarm configurations
Different alarm configurations were tested with the hospital data. Settings were swept
through their determined range to create plots which show the effect of different
configurations. As expected, widening thresholds and lengthening delays and the
averaging window reduced the number of nuisance alarms. The plots can easily be
used to determine an acceptable configuration for a specific alarm.
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Figure 9 shows the effect of limits and delays on the SpO2 Low alarm rate. The
effect of changing alarm configurations is in line with previous studies covered in
Section 2.3. Similar results were observerd with other parameter alarms as well.
Pulse rate low alarms were drastically reduced when lowering the low limit from the
default 50.
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Figure 9: Spo2 low alarm rates depending on threshold and delay
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For clarity, the effect of averaging was separately plotted, as results suggested it’s
effect on alarm rates was smaller. Figure 11 shows the effect of the moving average on
alarm rates. We can observe a large drop in alarm count when applying the filtering.
Total alarm rate was reduced by 8 alarm per patient per day. Lengthening the
averaging window further reduced the alarms, but reductions were not so significant
anymore. The effect of filtering length is further studied in the next section.
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We can also see how it affects parameter values as a whole, when plotting
distributions them before and after filtering. Figure 12 shows the effect of applying
averaging to the parameter values. These histograms also show the number of
physiologically outlying values found in each parameter. Filtering reduces the
number of these threshold violating values, which reduces total violation time and
subsequently the number of alarms.
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The nature of threshold violation was analysed as well, and it seems that most
violations are short, which suggests they are caused by artefacts or temporary
anomalies in the physiological parameters. The amplitude of the violation periods
was analysed as well. Violation amplitude tends to be small as well. A clinically
relevant change in parameter value would typically be long lasting and quite significant
in amplitude too. This information, coupled with alarm threshold violation lengths
shown in figure 13, suggest that widening thresholds, applying delays and lengthening
the averaging window might be effective in reducing clinically irrelevant threshold
violations, while not affecting those which result from a relevant physiological change.
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Figure 13: Alarm threshold violations. Parameter units have been normalised.
Alarm burstiness is a useful metric to describe system stability. It is the number
of separate alarm events happening within a certain period of time. High alarm
burstiness results from sensitive systems which easily trigger alarms often, while low
burstiness means fewer alarms are present in a certain time period. In the clinical
monitoring context, low burstiness is preferable, as the monitored physiological
system is relatively stable, and possibly relevant alarm-triggering conditions don’t
change that quickly. The first picture 14 displays system alarm burstiness with
default settings. We can observer as high as 10 separate alarms in a 5 minute interval,
which is extremely high. The goal is to cut the higher values from the histogram.
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The duration of clinically relevant alarms is typically relatively long. Short alarms
contribute to burstiness, and are usually caused by artefacts and temporary anomalies.
The second figure in 14 shows that most alarms are short in duration. Short alarms
can be effectively managed with delays.
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Figure 14: Alarm burstiness and durations
The next section presents results of the optimisation process, which sought to
find optimal configurations for alarm generation, with settings that minimise the
number of nuisance alarms while not sacrificing patient safety.
4.2 Optimisation
Optimisation was performed with both brute force and simulated annealing meth-
ods. The former obviously yielded perfect solutions, but was very time consuming.
Simulated annealing optimisation produced sub-optimal solutions compared to brute
force, but was able to provide solutions to the problem much more quickly than a
complete search.
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4.2.1 Optimisation results
Complete searches over the possible configurations yielded tradeoff plots. Figure 15
shows these results for SpO2 alarms. In the plot, the total relative delay is plotted
against alarm count. Details of this metric are explained in the Methods section.
The tradeoff plot can be used to choose best combinations of projected alarm count
and applied delay to alarm generation. Similar plots were created for all optimised
alarm configurations. We can clearly see the pareto-front in the plot below. As
discussed in the optimisation methods section, changing the weights of the optimised
sum would shift our choice of optimum value on this line.
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Figure 15: Tradeoff plot of spo2 alarm count and total relative delay
The results of simulated annealing are not as complete as those of brute force,
but producing them was much less time-consuming. Simulated annealing produced
satisfactory results in a fraction of the time taken by brute force. Brute force runs
took about 4 – 5 hours, while the average time of convergence for the optimiser was
around 10 minutes. Sensitivity to the data set was estimated by cross-validating the
results. Graphic results for SpO2 optimiser cross validation are displayed in figure 16.
Correlation analysis and Principal component analysis were applied to brute-force
results, in order to study the significance of alarm configuration input factors.
Cross-validation results gave insight into the optimisers dependence on the data
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set. Combined with statistical analysis of brute force results, information about the
importance of configuration inputs was revealed. In general, the optimiser seemed to
converge pretty well. The relationship between alarm delay and parameter averaging
seems to be a linear tradeoff. For example, the SpO2 optimiser always converged on
the same limits, but delay and averaging optimums had some variance. Limits where
very consistent with all parameters. Correlation and principal component analysis
suggested the strongest correlation between alarm count and alarm setting was with
limit, followed by delay and averaging.
From the following plot, we can determine confidence intervals for the input pa-
rameters, specifically those that have higher variance and dependencies between each
other. Confidence intervals for these parameters are shown in the final configuration
table 10. The points in the plots below are optimal solutions given by the optimiser
using different data sets. The plot clearly shows a linear dependence between the
two input variables plotted.
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Figure 16: Cross validation results for SpO2 alarm optimiser. Individual dots are
optimal solutions given by the optimiser.
A similar relationship between delay and averaging was also true with other
parameters as well. Below the results for Pulse rate optimisation.
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With the optimised configuration parameters obtained from the optimisation
process, we were able to reduce alarm rates considerably. Table 10 shows alarm rates
subcategorised by parameters and alarm types. The total reduction in nuisance alarms
was significant, and no clinically relevant alarms were missed. The distribution of
patient alarm rates was deemed unreliable due to small sample size, so a bootstrapping
technique was applied for estimating the underlying distribution of mean patient
alarm rates. Figure 18 shows the result of this process. The underlying patient alarm
rate distribution is fat-tailed, which is typical of populations where few individuals
contribute a large portion of the total number of events. This property can still be
seen in the distribution of mean alarm rates, which is slightly skewed.
This model estimates the mean alarm rate that end users may expect to see with
the system. It is the mean calculated from a bootstrapping sample of patient alarm
rates. The largest value of each bootstrap sample was removed, because we expect
individuals with very high alarm rate will be handled differently by changing their
alarm settings in order to reduce alarm burden. This graphic is useful for estimating
the expected mean alarm rate. The 95 % confidence interval was also calculated to
be at 2.1 – 15.0.
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Figure 18: Distribution of mean alarm rates for system. 95 % confidence interval:
2.1 – 15.0. The dashed line is the mean.
4.2.2 Optimised parameters
There can be many interpretation as to what the optimal parameters for this system
are. However, to facilitate the decision-making process, we developed two separate
sensitivity profiles for the system, sensitive and insenstive. The former aims to
make the system more sensitive to anomalies, therefore accepting more alarms to be
sounded. Alarms that have been classified as "Possible" by clinical specialists are
considered important.
The insensitive profile minimises all alarms except clinically relevant ones, which
have been classified as True by nurses. In this study, only a single SpO2 low alarm
was classified as True and clinically relevant, so the insensitive profile is not ideal for
the optimiser. Futhermore, some alarms don’t have relevant events, so we must rely
on other constraints when minimising.
The other constraints depend very much on the clinical perspective taken on
the matter. Alarm thresholds and delays must be kept within a reasonable range.
Discussions with clinical specialists and examining literature suggested that delays
and thresholds cannot be lowered too much, even if the alarm classification would
allow the optimiser to do so. A total relative delay of 60 seconds was chosen as a
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good constraint for relaxing the alarm rules. With this constraint, two sets of alarm
configuration profiles were calculated, insensitive and sensitive. The former is shown
under, and is the official recommendation of this thesis work. The sensitive profile
includes possible alarms, which might be useful in some situations.
Table 9: Table of suggested configurations and their effect on alarm rate for insensitive
system profile. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses for optimised alarms.
Alarm Limit Delay (s) Averaging (s) Rate (n/day) Reduction (%)
SpO2 low (%) 85 30 (20–32) 30 (28–40) 3.0 78
SpO2 critical (%) 80 10 30 2.6 75
Pr low (bpm) 44 45 (40–50) 30 (25–35) 1.6 82
Pr high (bpm) 150 10 (7–11) 30 (29–36) 0.4 0
Rr low (bpm) 6 30 30 0.6 0
Rr high (bpm) 37 45 (40–48) 5 (3–10) 0.0 100
Apnoea (s) 20 0 0 0.0 0
Check probe N/A 25 0 1.0 89
Probe off N/A 30 0 1.4 0
Table 10: Table of suggested configurations and their effect on alarm rate for sensitive
system profile. 95 % confidence intervals in parentheses for optimised alarms.
Alarm Limit Delay (s) Averaging (s) Rate (n/day) Reduction (%)
SpO2 low (%) 85 30 (20–32) 30 (28–40) 3.0 78
SpO2 critical (%) 80 10 30 2.6 75
Pr low (bpm) 49 30 (28–37) 45 (40–50) 5.9 35
Pr high (bpm) 150 10 (7–11) 30 (29–36) 0.4 0
Rr low (bpm) 6 30 30 0.6 0
Rr high (bpm) 36 20 (17–24) 22 (10–24) 2.8 0
Apnoea (s) 20 0 0 0.0 0
Check probe N/A 25 0 1.0 89
Probe off N/A 30 0 1.4 0
It is clear that by relaxing alarm thresholds, we can greatly reduce the generated
load. Reduction percentages are also in line with previous studies. No clinically
relevant event would be missed with these settings, based on data collected in this
study. The number of possible alarms with the above system profiles is 9 and 34,
respectively.
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Figure 19: Alarm rates with sensitive settings subcategorised by class
When plotting results for the sensitive system settings, we can see a clear increase
in both false and possible alarms, specifically in Pulse rate low and Respiratory rate
high alarms, which had events of this kind. SpO2 also had a couple of them, which
explains the increase of those too. Essentially keeping the Possible alarms in causes a
in increase in collateral Irrelevant and False alarms as well, especially with Pulse rate
and Respiratory rate. On the other hand, these increases were due to patients with
specific conditions which caused the alarms. These could be treated with individual
patient limits as well.
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Figure 20: Alarm rates with insensitive settings subcategorised by class
The two sensitivity profiles both succeed in lowering the overall alarm load.
The final question remains a clinical one, whether or not we want to include lower
criticality alarm situations or not. Another question are the individual settings
which may be applied ad hoc to specific patients. The next image shows the total
alarm load reduction from the original default settings against the sensitive, sensitive
individual, and insensitive settings. We can see a clear reduction even with sensitive
settings, which can be further improved by using individual settings for patients with
special circumstances. However, the insenstive settings got the lowest alarm rates.
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5 Discussion
This section discusses the research project, problems, and results. The principal
questions are related to the validity of the study protocol and produced results. The
dilemma of system sensitivity is also a matter that merits further discussion. Lastly,
the combination of clinical and technical perspectives is interesting as well.
The aim of this thesis was to investigate ways to reduce clinically irrelevant alarms
of a patient monitoring system. Results of this thesis suggest patient monitoring
alarm configurations can be optimised in order to reduce irrelevant alarms. Based on
collected data, no relevant alarms were missed, and irrelevant alarms were reduced
on average by about 80 %.
The alarm configurations proposed in this study were based on a model constructed
from observations of a patient population. The main factors in this model were
the annotation process applied on the original patient population, and the clinical
knowledge used to further guide the research project. The practical work itself was
straightforward, as was the optimisation process.
The study conducted during the making of this thesis was valid in principle,
but had some limitations. The amount of data is not large, which leads to a small
number of observed events in general. Especially the number of potentially adverse
events and clinically relevant alarms is low. In fact, only a single event was recorded.
This means all other parameters did not have a reference for a potentially dangerous
event. The credibility of the optimised parameters suffers from this, which is why
the possible alarm class was also used to constrain the optimisation process. With it,
we were able to produce reasonable optimal configurations, which minimised alarms
while keeping clinical safety interests in mind. However, the optimisation process
would definitely benefit from more data. When estimating the expected alarm load,
methods such as bootstrapping were used in order to address this issue, but the fact
remains that 118 hours of patient data is not enough.
Annotation of patient data proved to challenging as well. Ambiguous guidelines
and their varying interpretations led to high variance of annotations, which eventually
forced us to re-evaluate all annotations. Fortunately this did solve the issue. For
future research, it is important to define annotation protocols strictly and clearly. Of
course, annotation is also a very subjective process which is affected by the individual,
environment and patient; this makes the technique an inherent uncertain factor in
the research method. Increasing the number of observers might help with this issue.
More data would also help smoothing out intraobserver differences.
Another point of interest regarding this study was the question of system sensitivity.
There is always a tradeoff between alarm load and sensitivity to measurement change,
and determining the optimal position between them is tricky. The flexible way to
define system sensitivity protocols proved an elegant solutions for bringing different
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requirements and needs to system configurations. Also, the possibility to define
individual settings for specific patients is strongly recommended.
From a technical and engineering point of view, it is clear that we can simply
use collected data to optimise the behaviour of the system, and trust that the data
contains the truth about different patients that might be monitored by the system.
The clinical point of view is, understandably, quite different. Patients vary greatly,
and nurses are not keen to risk their safety. Better safe than sorry is the prevalent
approach to clinical alarms. Maybe it should be so, but research such as this does
bring about an additional, practical point of view to the question.
It is important to determine clear definitions and requirements for continuous
monitoring in low acuity environments such as surgical wards. Because this practice
is relatively new and rare, it is not yet well defined. Traditional high acuity protocols,
stemming from Intensive Care Units or Operating rooms, can be applied, but clearly
result in too many alarms. Low acuity wards with less critical patients and lower nurse
to patient ratios cannot sustain high acuity alarm rates, which is why monitoring
alarm behaviour should be adjusted accordingly. This study methodology is a viable
tool for supporting decisions on low-acuity continuous monitoring practices.
Further research is still needed to better shed light on these issues. Additional
annotated patient data will reinforce the model for monitoring requirements in low
acuity hospital environments.
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6 Summary
This thesis is about a research study done during the clinical testing phase of a
new patient monitor. It aims at optimising the alarm behaviour of the system, thus
adding to overall patient safety. The optimisation is done by utilising an annotated
reference of alarms recorded during the hospital test cases. Hospital data is rerun
afterwards with different alarm configurations, and these are optimised using the
reference. The goal is to minimise clinically irrelevant alarms while keeping relevant
ones.
Principal results of the study are various information about the alarm rate and
validity of the system. Optimisation results comprise of optimal configurations for
alarms. For these, two separate profiles are provided, as some situations require more
sensitive monitoring. Results suggest the number of clinically irrelevant alarms is
high, and there is room for relaxing the alarm thresholds.
The study methodology proved viable for this kind of research, and data collection
and analysis will continue towards improving the model further.
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